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EVERYTHING IS NOT WHAT IT SEEMS, AND WHAT
IT IS, IS BROKEN: RE-DEFINING PRODUCTION IN
THE OIL AND GAS LEASE HABENDUM CLAUSE
FISHER LYNN FULTON
I. Introduction
Oil and gas leases can be simple, or they can be complex. More often
than not, litigation arises out of non-specific terms of the lease defined
differently by parties with different interests in mind. The production
company/lessee wants the right to drill, without ever being obligated to
drill. Simultaneously, the owner of the mineral deed/lessor wants the profits
of royalty payments that come from the lessee for a producing well. So
when lease agreements are litigated, it is difficult to manage all of the
competing interests. One area of the oil and gas contract that causes
litigation is the satisfaction of the habendum clause. More specifically the
word “production” in the habendum clause.
In Oklahoma, production is a term of art. However, the definition of that
term of art is anything but definitive. Section I introduces the questions to
ponder for the purpose of this paper. Section II provides key information to
understanding the terminology of an oil and gas lease, how oil and gas
leases work, as well as principles the court applies to answer questions
about lease validity. Section III highlights the process used in Oklahoma,
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and jurisdictions following the same analysis, to determine what production
is. Section IV will introduce an alternative to the current definition and
legal analysis used in Oklahoma. Lastly, Section V will give a concise
summary of the argument.
II. Background and Key Terms
There are a few key concepts one must understand before going further.
Oil and gas leases use many terms of art and many clauses that may appear
independent, but actually work only in reference to prior clauses. First, we
will discuss what the primary term is, and where in the lease it originates.
Second, commencement is defined, and the importance of commencement
is considered. Third, the secondary term will be introduced along with
savings clauses. Fourth, we will discuss the prudent operator standard.
Finally, production will be defined.
A. Primary Term
The oil and gas lease is made up of many pieces that fit together to create
a very complex legal document. The habendum clause is the portion of the
oil and gas lease which sets out the time frame for the lease.1 It is typical
for the habendum clause to allocate for a primary term, also called an
exploratory term, and a secondary term.2 The primary term is defined as the
duration in which the lessee has the right to drill but not the obligation to
drill.3 Typically this is defined as a fixed term of years, which can then
continue if oil and gas are produced.4
The primary term does not have to be defined as a term of years.5 In
Butler v. Iola, the gas lease defined the primary term by describing a
different lease held by the lessees, which stated that the Butler Iola lease’s
primary term would last until the lessee no longer held the other lease.6 This
lease did not have a set expiration of the primary term.7 The contingency
with the other lease created the possibility that the lease could continue

1. John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 336 (Thomson West,
5th ed. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.4 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
5. See Butler v. Iola, 100 Kan. 111, 113-14 (Kan. 1917).
6. Id. at 113.
7. Butler v. Iola, 100 Kan. 111, 113 (Kan. 1917).
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operating in the primary term for an indefinite amount of time.8 The court
held the lease valid.9 One argument was that the lease terms were too
indefinite, so much so that the lease should be rendered invalid.10 However,
the court said that “if [the lessor] does not complain that his rights might be
arbitrarily terminated or his liabilities unduly extended by the act or
conduct of the parties to the other lease, we see no reason why the [lessee]
can complain.”11
The primary term does not require production to maintain the lease.12 In
P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. Groce, the lessor argued that the lease was terminated
by a failure of the lessee to satisfy the habendum clause.13 The court looked
to the language of the lease to settle the dispute.14 The relevant lease
language was “TO HAVE AND TO HOLD THE SAME FOR A TERM OF
ONE YEAR FROM THIS DATE, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
THE PRIMARY TERM, AND AS LONG THEREAFTER AS OIL OR
GAS . . . IS PRODUCED THEREFROM.”15 The court ruled that by the
language of the lease, the primary term did not require production.16
However, for the lease to extend into the secondary term production as
defined by the lease would be required.17
B. Commencement
In order for a lease to extend from the primary term to the secondary
term instead of terminating, there are certain requirements that must be met
depending on the specific clauses in the lease.18 Production is not a
requirement of satisfying commencement of operations.19 One such
requirement is commencement of drilling operations.20 However, to call it

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. Groce, 792 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
13. Id. at 719-20.
14. Id. at 719.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 720.
17. Id.
18. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Seventh Edition § 604.1 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018).
19. See Prowant v. Sealy, 1919 OK 304.
20. Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp., 240 So. 2d 589, 590 (La. Ct. App 1970).
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commencing drilling operations is misleading. Commencing operations can
be satisfied in many different ways without the drill bit turning.21
The drilling rig does not even need to be on location for the
commencement clause to be satisfied. In Moore Oil v. Snakard, the
defendant lessee held a contract with a third party to commence
operations.22 Two days prior to the expiration of the primary term of the
lease, the defendant was notified that the third party was not going to
commence operations at the site.23 On the final day of the primary term, the
lessee hired four men to come and search for one of the abandoned wells on
the property.24 The bulldozer operator arrived and began to work prior to
midnight of that same day.25 The court ruled that these actions satisfied
commencement of operations for the terms of the lease.26 The court noted
that the defendant acted upon a good faith intention to drill the well to
completion.27
In order to satisfy commencement of operations it is not necessary that
the drill bit be turning in the ground. It is not even necessary for a drilling
rig to be on site. Moore Oil v. Snakard shows that as long at the producer
has done something to further the goal of drilling a well to completion, and
has done so with good faith, commencement is satisfied. Martin and
Kramer state:
The courts have held that actual drilling by the lessee is not
necessary to satisfy the commencement of drilling operations
standard. If the lessee has hauled material on the lease, dug slush
pits, staked out a drilling site, and obtained a drilling permit, if
required, from the appropriate regulatory agency, the courts will
almost certainly find that drilling operations have been
commenced.28

21. Compare Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp., 240 So. 2d 589, (La. Ct. App 1970) (holding
that building a board road and turn around satisfied commencement of operations) with
Stolz, Wagner, & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, (WD Okla. 1976) (holding that doing
dirt work around the intended drill site satisfied commencement of operations).
22. Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, 256 (WD Okla. 1957).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 257-58.
27. Id.
28. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Seventh Edition § 606.1 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018).
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Courts in Oklahoma use the method of determining commencement as
outlined by Professor Eugene Kuntz. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
noted, after reviewing Kuntz’s interpretation of the law and his test for
commencement, that it was in line with the court’s view.29 Kuntz states
three factors in considering if operations have commenced: (1) acts on the
land, (2) good faith intention of the lessee to complete the well, and (3)
diligence in continuing drilling operations.30
C. Secondary Term
After commencing operations and the expiration of the primary term, the
lease enters into the secondary term. There are many ways in which this can
occur. Typically lease language that graduates the lease from the primary
term requires oil and gas to be producing in paying quantities, the capability
of production of oil and gas in paying quantities, or for current operations
for oil and gas production.31 Another way an oil and gas lease may enter the
secondary term is via a savings clause.32 Typical savings clauses for an oil
and gas lease include the continuous drilling clause, the continuous
operations clause, and the well completion clause to name a few.33 When
the lessee has commenced operations by the end of the primary term but is
not yet producing, the lessee must rely on the savings clause to extend the
lease into the secondary term.34
1. Lack of a Savings Clause
In the absence of any savings provisions, the habendum clause governs
the term limits of the lease.35 If the habendum clause is not satisfied, the
lease cannot extend.36 In J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, the primary term of the
lease was for one (1) year.37 Lessee did not begin drilling operations until
two (2) days prior to the set expiration date.38 Lessee argued, although at
the expiration of the primary term, oil and gas were not being produced in
29. 21st Century Inv. Co. v. Pine, 1986 CIV APP 27, ¶24.
30. 3 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 32.3 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
31. John S. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 186-87 (7th ed. 2019).
32. Id. at 187.
33. See Id., and see John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 273
(Thomson West, 7th ed. 2018).
34. See John S. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 251-52 (7th ed. 2019).
35. See J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 682 (Mich. 1929).
36. Id.
37. See Id. at 676.
38. See Id. at 676-77.
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paying quantities, Lessee had the right to drill the well to completion.39 The
relevant parts of the lease contained a habendum clause and a development
clause.40 Lessors argued the habendum clause governed, and the
development clause did not serve to extend the lease under these
circumstances.41 The court found in favor of the lessor, ruling the lease was
expired.42 The court said that the greatest weight of authority showed that
the habendum clause is the dominating clause when it comes to determining
the time limits of the lessee’s rights.43 The court also stated “[a] late
start…does not excuse failure to produce.”44 In dicta, the court advised that
“[i]n fairness to lessors, extension provisions should be made plain.”45
2. Inapplicable Savings Clauses
It can be difficult for a lease to enter the secondary term even with
savings clauses in the lease. Lessees cannot plan for every imaginable
scenario, and savings clauses are often construed strictly and against the
lessee.46 In Rogers v. Osborn, the court did exactly that.47 Lessees
completed a well on the expiration of the lease, and it was not producing.48
The lease expired unless there was an applicable savings clause.49 Lessees
argued the reworking operations and the drilling of a second well saved the
lease.50 The court ruled in favor of the lessor.51 There was not a savings
clause that was exactly tailored to the circumstances.52 The court construed
the dry hole clause, the reworking clause, and the cessation of production
clause literally.53 When this situation arises, the lease cannot be propelled
into the secondary term.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Id. at 676.
See Id. at 676-77.
See Id. at 678-79.
See J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 682 (Mich. 1929).
See Id. at 679.
See Id.
See Id. at 681.
See John S. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 251 (7th ed. 2019).
See Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 546 (Tex. 1953).
See Id. at 542.
See Id.
See Id. at 543.
See Id. at 546.
See Id. at 543 and 546.
See Id. at 546.
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3. Multiple Savings Clauses
However, in other instances there can be multiple provisions which may
be applicable but ultimately only one prevails.54 In Long v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., the primary term was set to expire in September 11, 1955.55
The lease contained an “unless” type delay rental clause.56 If operations to
drill a well were not commenced within the first year of the lease, the lease
would terminate unless lessee paid delay rentals to the lessor.57 Lessor
argued that under this provision, the lease had expired because the lessee
did not pay the delay rental.58 On the other hand, Lessee argued the delay
rental was not due, as the lease was saved under the reworking and
additional drilling clause.59 Lessee drilled a producing well prior to
September 11, 1955.60 This well produced from November 1952, until
December 1954, when production declined in quantity and quality.61 Lessee
placed the well on a pumping schedule in December 1954, in an effort to
increase the flow of oil, but the intended results could not be achieved. 62 In
February 1955, lessee began to rework the well using the “sandfrac”
method, attempting to create new openings for the oil to flow through.63
Again, lessee’s efforts failed to get the well to produce at the previous
rate.64 Although these efforts failed, the well was still producing sellable
oil, just not to the same quantity.65 As a result, the court ruled the lessor’s
argument that the lease expired for failure to pay the delay rental was
without merit.66 The Lessee had also begun drilling additional wells while
still working on the first well.67 The well never ceased production and
therefore the delay rental clause was not applicable.68 As a result, the
reworking and additional drilling clause ruled, not the delay rental clause.69
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 430 (Neb. 1958).
See Id. at 413.
See Id. at 420.
See Id. at
See Id. at 413 and 421.
See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 421 (Neb. 1958).
See Id. at 424.
See Id. at 428-29.
See Id. at 429.
See Id. at
See Id. at
See Id. at 429-30.
See Id. at 430.
See Id. at 431.
See Id. at
See Id. at 430-31.
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To enter the secondary term, the lessee must have satisfied the habendum
clause or an applicable savings clause.70 Sometimes it is difficult to satisfy a
savings clause, because the lease may not contain a savings clause that is
directly on point with the circumstances.71 When this occurs, the lease
cannot continue. Similarly, a lease might not contain any savings clauses. In
this scenario, the lessee has no other avenue other than to strictly satisfy the
terms of the habendum clause.72 The only way to satisfy the habendum
clause in this manner is to have a well that is currently producing before or
at the end of the primary term.73 When there are multiple savings clauses in
a lease, the court must turn to the particular facts of the case to determine
which savings clause is applicable.74 By determining which, if any, savings
clauses apply the court can determine if the lease is continued into the
secondary term or terminated.
D. Prudent Operator Obligation
After the commencement of operations and entering the secondary term,
there is a necessary gap between commencement and completion of a well.
This gap must be filled with actions taken by the producer that are prudent.
Prudent operations are defined as working in a manner that shows good
faith intent and due diligence.75
The obligation of being a prudent operator during the execution of an oil
and gas lease is usually found by the courts to be an implied covenant
requiring the lessee to act diligently towards the lessor.76 This implied
covenant requires the operator to act in good faith, competently, and with
the lessor’s interests in mind.77 Some view the prudent operator covenant as
absolute, while others only apply a test of good faith.78 However, the
majority of jurisdictions view the prudent operator standard as requiring
70. See Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 542 (Tex. 1953).
71. See John S. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 251 (7th ed. 2019) and see Rogers
v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 546 (Tex. 1953).
72. See J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 678-79 (Mich. 1929).
73. See Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 542 (Tex. 1953).
74. See generally Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 166 Neb. 410, 430 (Neb. 1958).
75. See Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 563-64 (WD Okla.
1976).
76. John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 642 (Thomson West,
5th ed. 2008).
77. John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 642 (Thomson West,
5th ed. 2008).
78. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Eighth Edition § 806.3 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2020).
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more than just good faith.79 Perhaps the clearest iteration of this view was
made by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals: “[w]hatever, in the
circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary
prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is
required.”80 This version of the standard is extremely similar to the
reasonable person standard of tort law.81
1. “Continuous” Requirement
Failure to continuously operate on site is not prudent.82 In Moore, the
defendant lessee commenced operations prior to the expiration of the
primary term.83 However, after a little more than four months operating
continuously the defendant ceased operations.84 This lapse in operations
lasted just over two months.85 The court found that by ceasing operations,
the extension of the primary term ended.86 “Continuous and diligent
operations by the defendant after July 1, 1955, were a condition limiting the
extension of the disputed leases.”87 The court decided that defendants’
conduct was “prudent and diligent” prior to ceasing operations.88 It follows
that by ceasing operations the defendant in Moore became imprudent,
because an element of prudent operations is continuous operations. Further,
any lapse in operations must be reasonable.89
Continuous operations do not require physical or symbolic presence on
the lease premises.90 In Blair v. Nw. Ohio Nat. Gas Co., the lease was set to
expire in February 1895, unless the yearly payment of $100 was paid
prior.91 In December of 1894, the single gas well on the property stopped
producing.92 Later that month, the lessee built a rig over the well in order to
79. See Id. at
80. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
81. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Eighth Edition § 806.3 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2020).
82. See Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, 258 (WD Okla. 1957).
83. See Id.
84. See Id. at 256-57.
85. See Id. at
86. See Id. at 258.
87. Id.
88. See Id. at 257-58.
89. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Seventh Edition § 618.3 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018).
90. See Blair v. Nw. Ohio Nat. Gas Co., 12 Ohio C.C. 78, 85 (Cir. Ct. 1896).
91. See Id. at 83-84.
92. See Id. at 83.
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pull tubing, clean the well, and drill deeper to improve the well.93 This
continued for six weeks, until it was determined to be an impractical
endeavor.94 By this time, the yearly payment was due to the lessor.95 Upon
delivery of the payment, lessee asked lessor where would be a good
location to drill a new well.96 Lessor did not show any inclinations of
believing the lease had expired.97 From this point, the lessee began
developing plans for the new well and began physical operations of drilling
in April.98 Lessor argued that when the original well stopped producing, the
lease was terminated.99 The court ruled that the lessees endeavored
continuous operations to fix the existing well, and then to drill a second
well even though they were not on the lease land at all times. 100 As a result,
these continuous operations extended the life of the lease.
2. “Good Faith” Requirement
Operations must be continuous. However, the lessee’s timeline doesn’t
need to meet any expectations so long as it is done in good faith.101 In SonLin Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., defendant operator did not make the
decision to drill until about 10 days prior to the end of the primary term of
the lease.102 However, once the decision was made, the defendant began to
search for a deep drilling rig to contract.103 The rig the lessee was able to
secure was not intended to drill past a depth of 12,000 feet, but was rated to
go to 15,000 feet deep when used with great care. 104 Plaintiffs argue the
slow drilling was representative of the defendant’s imprudence and bad
faith.105 The court ruled the defendant did act prudently when searching for
a drilling rig.106 “[T]he Defendants had the good faith intention to
unqualifiedly drill the well . . . to completion in the Atoka formation which
93. Blair v. Nw. Ohio Nat. Gas Co., 12 Ohio C.C. 78, 83 (Cir. Ct. 1896).
94. See Id.
95. See Id.
96. See Id.
97. See Id. at 84.
98. See Id.
99. See Id.
100. See Id.
101. See Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, (WD Okla. 1957), and see Son-Lin
Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1 (WD Okla. 1982).
102. See Son-Lin Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1, 2 (WD Okla. 1982).
103. See Id.
104. See Id. at 3.
105. See Id.
106. Son-Lin Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1, 3 (WD Okla. 1982).
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in fact they did.”107 Not only was the search for the rig prudent operation,
the slow drilling process was also found to be prudent operation done in
good faith.108 While the court noted that it would have been imprudent for
the defendants to use a deep drilling rig to slow operations, without a deep
drilling rig, it was responsible and prudent to take things slow.109
In the case of Geier-Jackson, Inc. v. James, the oil and gas lease between
the lessor and the lessee stated in part that if drilling was not commenced
then the lease would be terminated.110 The land was in ‘wildcat’ country,
meaning no oil and gas had been discovered in the surrounding tracts of
land.111 Lessee was waiting to develop on lessor’s land until after a well
was set up on a nearby tract with a different owner. In the meantime, a road
was built on lessor’s land to the location of the future well.112 At the
expiration of the oil and gas lease primary term, lessee had done nothing
more than build the road to the location.113 Lessor alerted lessee that the
lease was expired and brought suit.114 The court found in favor of the lessor,
ruling that the oil and gas lease had expired.115 Even though the lessee built
the road to the location of the future well, he stopped further operations
until he knew the results of the well on the neighboring tract of land.116
Lessee made the decision to begin operations again dependent on the
success or failure of a well on different property than was subject to the
lease.117 This action was not taken with “the good faith intention to pursue
with the standard of diligence set forth” in the oil and gas lease.118
From the Son-Lin case we can add to our definition of prudent operations
responsible acts with the intent to complete a well. Geier-Jackson qualifies
this intent. The intent must not be dependent upon the success or failure of
another well. If it is found that an operator based his decision to drill to
completion or not in order to continue operations in the secondary term on
another’s actions, then the operator did not act within the constraints of the
implied covenant of prudent operations.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Id.
See Id.
See Id. at 4.
Geier-Jackson, Inc. v. James, 160 F. Supp. 524, 525 (E.D. Tex. 1958).
See Id. at 527.
See Id.
See Id.
See Id. at 528.
See Id. at 520-31.
See Id. at 527-30.
Geier-Jackson, Inc. v. James, 160 F. Supp. 524, 529 (E.D. Tex. 1958).
See Id. at 529 -30.
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A prudent operator acts with good faith intent to unqualifiedly complete
a well diligently, continuously, and responsibly. As long as these conditions
are met, the lease will be extended past the primary term at least to
completion of the well.119 However, as soon as one of these conditions is no
longer met, the operator runs the possibility of losing the lease. 120 These
requirements of acting with good faith, due diligence, continuity, and
responsibility are the same factors that Kuntz says an operator needs to
satisfy commencement.121 If an operator continues to act in the same
manner from satisfaction of commencement to satisfaction of completion,
the gap will have been filled with prudent operation.
Two final notes to bear in mind when thinking about prudent operations
is that there are certain exceptions to continuity and the gap between
completion of a well and production. There can be cessation of operations
that are specifically allowed by provisions in the oil and gas lease.122 One
example of such a provision is the shut-in royalty clause.123 Second, just as
there is a gap between commencement and completion, there is likewise a
gap between completion and production.124 This gap must be filled with
prudent operations in the same manner as the gap between commencement
and completion.
E. Production
The lease can extend out of the primary term and into the secondary term
if it provides for an extension via production.125 To be more specific, with
regards to the habendum clause, production means production in paying
quantities, or economically viable to continue production.126
To produce in paying quantities is to have the well pay in excess of its
operating costs.127 In Clifton v. Koontz, lessee’s well produced both oil and
119. See Son-Lin Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1 (WD Okla. 1982).
120. Compare Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, (WD Okla. 1957) with Son-Lin
Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1 (WD Okla. 1982).
121. 3 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 32.3 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
122. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Seventh Edition § 618.3 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018).
123. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
Abridged Seventh Edition § 616.4 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2018).
124. See Id. at § 618.2.
125. John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 365 (Thomson West,
5th ed. 2008).
126. See Id.
127. See Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 (Tex. 1959).
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gas.128 However, the amount of oil and gas that was the product of this well
was relatively small, which resulted in the lessor arguing the lease was
terminated via failure to produce during the range of months cited.129 The
total loss for the time period cited by the lessor was $216.16.130 The court
ruled in favor of the lessee, finding that the well was still producing.131 In
reaching this conclusion, the court said that with a marginal well you must
look to whether or not a reasonable operator would continue the well under
the relevant circumstances for purposes more than mere speculation.132
Some of the factors are: The depletion of the reservoir and the
price for which the lessee is able to sell his product, the relative
profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and
marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a
reasonable period of time under the circumstances, and whether
or not the lessee is holding the lease merely for speculative
purposes.133
Applying such factors and stating that depreciation is not an expense for
purposes of determining paying quantities, the court ruled that the well was
producing over a period of time.134
The meaning of production for purposes of the habendum clause can be
defined simply as a well paying out more money than the operator is
putting into the well over a reasonable period of time. Clifton v. Koontz
qualifies production further when contemplating a marginal well. Not only
does one look to profit and loss, but one must also consider any other
reason that a prudent operator would continue to operate a marginal well in
that area. Without any other savings clause in the oil and gas lease, the
rights of the lessee to operate live and die by the habendum clause. More
specifically, the lessee’s operative rights live and die by the way that
production is defined in the habendum clause regardless of production’s
definition in separate clauses in the oil and gas lease.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Id.
See Id. at 86.
See Id.
See Id. at 90.
See Id.
Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 90 (Tex. 1959).
See Id.
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F. Tying It Together
Oil and gas leases contain many different clauses that all work together.
Some, such as the continuous drilling clause, operate in the best interest of
the lessee. Others, such as the delay rental clause, operate mainly for the
best interest of the lessor. While others still, such as the shut-in royalty
payment clause, operate in the best interest of both the lessee and the lessor.
The habendum clause is the term clause.135 This clause sets out the primary
term of the oil and gas lease.136 This is the period of time in which the
lessee has the right to drill an oil and gas well.137 Barring lease language to
the contrary, the lessee is not required to drill during this time.138 If the
habendum clause is satisfied, the lease automatically enters the secondary
term.
Commencement is a necessary element to satisfy the habendum clause
and necessary to satisfy a savings clause. Commencement of drilling
operations does not require actual drilling.139 Instead, it requires the
operator to undertake necessary steps with the intent to drill a well to
completion. This can be, but is not limited to, actions such as clearing land
for a road to the drill site, staking out a drill location, building a turnaround,
locating a drilling rig, etc.140 Three key factors to be looked at in
determining if commencement of operations has occurred are: (1) acts on
the land, (2) done with the intent to complete the well, and (3) diligent
continuous operations.141 Commencement is a key element of satisfying the
continuous operations clause as well as the continuous drilling clause.
In the event the habendum clause is not satisfied, the lease can only be
propelled into the secondary term by a savings clause.142 There are many
different savings clause provisions, however there may not always be an

135. See John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 226 (Thomson
West, 7th ed. 2018).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See P.M. Drilling, Inc. v. Groce, 792 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
139. See Stolz, Wagner, & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, (WD Okla. 1976)
140. Compare Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp., 240 So. 2d 589, (La. Ct. App 1970) (holding
that building a board road and turn around satisfied commencement of operations) with
Stolz, Wagner, & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, (WD Okla. 1976) (holding that doing
dirt work around the intended drill site satisfied commencement of operations).
141. See 3 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 32.3 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
142. See J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 682 (Mich. 1929).
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applicable one in the lease.143 In the event that there is no savings clause,
the lease will be terminated at the end of the primary term.144 If there is an
applicable savings provision, then the lease will enter the secondary term.145
However, without actual production the lease will only remain in the
secondary term as long as the operator is prudent.
The obligation to operate prudently is an implied covenant within the oil
and gas lease.146 Being a prudent operator entails many things. A prudent
operator handles themselves and the lease in good faith and due
diligence.147 To operate with good faith, operations must be continuous.148
However, the oil and gas lease usually has provisions that allows for short
breaks in operation for reasonable interruptions. Although operations must
be continuous, they need not always be on site operations.149 There are
necessarily some planning operations that can be done, and sometimes must
be done, off site. The fact that the operator is off site periodically does not
mean that operations are not continuous. Similarly, the operator need not
operate in a manner that the lessor deems fit. As long as the lessee operates
in a manner that shows good faith intentions towards completing the well,
and thus satisfying the motivations of the lessor, the operator is acting
prudently. Slow operations, as long as they are done with good faith, are
also prudent. The intent to drill a well to completion cannot be contingent
upon factors that involve another lease.150 Part of having a good faith intent
is weighing the motivations of the lessor against the lessee’s own
motivations.
Production is necessary for the lease to continue indefinitely. However,
production does not mean any amount of oil or gas. Production means oil
and/or gas in paying quantities, or in amounts that make the well
economically viable.151 The total amount of sales must exceed operating

143. See generally J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 681-82 (Mich. 1929), and
see Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 543 and 546 (Tex. 1953).
144. See Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 543 and 546 (Tex. 1953).
145. See id. at 542.
146. See See John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 427
(Thomson West, 7th ed. 2018).
147. See Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 563-64 (WD Okla.
1976).
148. See Moore Oil v. Snakard, 150 F. Supp. 250, (WD Okla. 1957).
149. See Blair v. Nw. Ohio Nat. Gas Co., 12 Ohio C.C. 78, 85 (Cir. Ct. 1896).
150. See Son-Lin Farms v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1, 4 (WD Okla. 1982).
151. See John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 365 (Thomson
West, 5th ed. 2008).
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costs.152 This is not determined based on a specific instance in time though,
instead it is examined over a period of time as necessarily price changes
and oil flow fluctuate constantly.153 For a marginal producing well, you
must also look at other factors that would convince a prudent operator to
continue operating the well.
Lastly, there is a necessary gap between completion of a well and when
the well begins to produce in paying quantities. When this gap occurs
during the primary term, the lessee is protected from termination. However,
when this happens outside of the primary term the lessee can face
termination of the lease. This is the area of the oil and gas lease where
savings clauses matter most, and similarly the area of focus for this paper.
During this period of time the operations must not lapse unless there is
lease language to the contrary. A lessee will be given a ‘reasonable’ amount
of time to transition the well from a completed well to a producing well.
But how does one determine what is a reasonable amount of time?
Generally, it is easy to say that if a year has passed and the well is still not
producing that it is an unreasonable amount of time. Likewise, if only a few
weeks have passed and the well is still not producing, that this is still within
a reasonable timeframe. There is little that provides clear commentary on
this matter. So which party should be given the protection of the courts?
Lease language is usually construed strictly against the lessee, following a
principle of contract law that the party who writes the contract will have the
language elucidated against them. However, this clashes with the property
law principle that land should be as productive as possible.
III. Current Approach
The current analysis used by the courts to decide if a lease that is not
producing has been terminated has multiple steps. Each step has multiple
moving parts that depend on the specific facts of the case as well as the
specific language in the lease. The burden of proof is on the lessor to prove
that an operation is not productive.154 The first step is to determine if the
lease has successfully entered the secondary term. The second step, which
includes a two-part test, is to determine if the operation is productive. The
third and last step is taken with regards to the limited guidance on the
length of a reasonable period of time.
152. See Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82 (Tex. 1959).
153. Id.
154. 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.7(h) (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
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A. Step One
The first step in this approach is to determine if the lease has reached the
secondary term. If the lease is still in the primary term, production does not
affect the validity of the lease. During the secondary term, production does
affect the validity of a lease. How the lease reached the secondary term also
matters. When a lessee is able to drill and complete a well during the
primary term, and that well then produces in paying quantities, at the
expiration of the primary term the lease will automatically enter into the
secondary term by the terms of the habendum clause. When this occurs, the
first step of the analysis is shorter. To move the analysis along, the court
only needs to determine if the habendum clause of the lease was satisfied.155
If production was not reached during the primary term, and a savings clause
was applicable to propel the lease into the secondary term, the court must
first determine if the savings clause did in fact apply.
B. Step Two
Step two is to determine if an oil and gas well has produced. Step two
has two subparts, first an objective test and second a subjective test. Both
tests are subject to a reasonable period of time. First, we will discuss each
subpart and then focus on how courts determine what a reasonable period of
time is.
1. The Objective Test
The objective test asks a simple question, “do revenues exceed operating
expenses?” Whether or not the well ever pays out has no consequence in
the analysis. Stated another way, “[i]f the well pays a profit even though
small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying quantities, though it
may never repay its costs, and the operation as a whole may prove
unprofitable.”156
Operating expenses include many things, but in general it can be
simplified as stating that operating expenses are the required costs of lifting
the oil from the earth. For this reason, operating expenses are sometimes
called lifting costs. The Kansas Supreme Court defined lifting costs as
follows:

155. See Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948),
and see Henry v. Clay, 1954 OK 170, ¶ 7-8 (Okla. 1954).
156. Henry v. Clay, 1954 OK 170, ¶ 6 (Okla. 1954).
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These direct costs include labor, trucking, transportation
expense, replacement and repair of equipment, taxes, license and
permit fees, operator's time on the lease, maintenance and repair
of roads, entrances and gates, and expenses encountered in
complying with state laws which require the plugging of
abandoned wells and prevention of pollution.157
There are some expenses that may seem like they should be included in
lifting costs, but in fact are not. The initial costs to the lessee to drill the
producing well are not taken into consideration for this analysis.158
Although the initial cost of equipment to pump the well is not included in
lifting costs, some courts include depreciation of the equipment in lifting
costs.159
Essentially, for the objective test you would take the price that the oil or
gas was purchased for and subtract royalties and lifting costs.160 If the
difference is positive, then the well is producing in paying quantities.161 If
the difference is negative or zero, then the well is not producing in paying
quantities.162 However, the revenues and expenses are to be looked at across
a span of a reasonable amount of time, not just a specific month.163 This is
because oil and gas wells are subject to wide ranges of fluctuation,
depending on factors such as the flow of the well, the price of oil and gas,
and the general economy.164 If it is decided that the lease is producing, then
there is no need to move on and do the subjective test, and the analysis ends
there. In the event that the lease fails the objective test, then the court
moves on to the subjective test. There is no set of circumstances however
that cessation of production alone will terminate a lease, which is why the
subjective test is necessary.165

157. Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 314-15 (Kan. 1976).
158. See Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, ¶ 6 (Okla. 1979) and see Reese
Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 314 (Kan. 1976).
159. See Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, ¶ 9 (Okla. 1979) and see
Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 169, 176, (10 Cir. App. 1960), but see Texaco, Inc. v.
Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 594 (Kan. 1980) and see Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan.
300, 314 (Kan. 1976).
160. See Henry v. Clay, 1954 OK 170, ¶ 8 (Okla. 1954).
161. See Id.
162. See Id. at ¶ 11.
163. See Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 616, 623-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
164. 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.7(u) (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.).
165. See Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, ¶ 11, (Okla. 1979).
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2. The Subjective Test
When there is a failure to produce in paying quantities, the court then
asks if this failure is reasonable and justified in the light of all the
circumstances. The main case courts look to when applying this subjective
test is Clifton v. Koontz. In that case the court said:
In the case of a marginal well, such as we have here, the standard
by which paying quantities is determined is whether or not under
all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent operator
would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for
speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which
the well in question was operated.166
In short, the subjective test looks to see if there is any reason that a well
might not be producing, but a prudent operator would continue to operate
the well because they believed it would begin producing again.
There are many reasons why a well may temporarily stop producing. For
example, after a period of time the reservoir the oil is being extracted from
will drop to a level that no longer produces oil in paying quantities. 167 In a
situation such as this, it may be prudent to temporarily stop pumping to
raise the level of the reservoir once more.168 Similarly, the price of oil may
fall so low for a period that even if the well produces the same number of
barrels per day, it is no longer enough to exceed operating costs.
3. The Objective and Subjective Tests Working in Tandem
In practice, the two tests actually fit together like one step. Consider the
following case, T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka. Lessor sought for
forfeiture of the oil and gas lease on the grounds of lack of production in
paying quantities.169 Lessee maintained that they operated the lease in a
manner which produced in paying quantities and that was in good faith to
produce a profit.170 Lessor wanted to invalidate an 80-year-old lease over
the fact that in one single year, 1959, Lessee failed to produce a profit and
suffered a loss of $40, even though that single year was over 45 years
prior.171 The lessor argued that there was no need to determine the
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 89 (Tex. 1959).
See Ballanfonte v. Kimbell, 373 S.S.2d 119, 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
See Ballanfonte v. Kimbell, 373 S.S.2d 119, 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
See T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 204 (Pa. 2012).
See Id. at 204-05.
See Id. at 204 & 225.
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subjective factors of good faith after it was established that the lease failed
to produce in paying quantities in 1959, the good faith analysis should only
be done if the lease passes the objective test.172 Lessee argued that the
prevailing authoritative case requires such consideration of an operator’s
good faith.173 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the lease was
valid.174 Further, the court said that when determining if a marginal or
sporadic well is producing in paying quantities, examining the good faith
intention of the operator is required.175 Directly condemning the lessor’s
argument, the court stated “the test for determining in paying quantities
could never be purely objective.”176 It is the burden of the Lessor to
establish that the lessee acted in bad faith.177 While the evidence showed a
period of one year that the lease had operated at a loss, the lessor failed to
satisfy the burden showing that the lessee operated in bad faith.178
Consider the following Oklahoma case as an example of bad faith
intentions. When no equitable reasons are present to support a well being
shut down, such actions would be the result of bad faith intent.179 In Hunter
v. Clarkson, the primary term of the lease was set to expire on Dec. 12,
1961, unless oil or gas were being produced.180 The trial court determined
as a fact that production ceased for five months after the expiration of the
primary term, resulting in the termination of the lease by its own terms.181
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the specific circumstance in this
case showed that the cessation of production was purely voluntary.182 An
operator cannot produce oil only at times where it fits his needs.183
C. Reasonable Period Guidance
Courts are hesitant to establish a hard-and-fast rule as to what defines a
reasonable period of time to look at when determining if a lease is
producing in paying quantities. In T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., the court
said “with regard to what constitutes a reasonable time period by which to
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Id. at 215-16.
See Id. at 215.
See Id. at 203.
See Id. at 224.
See Id. at 221-22.
See T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 207 (Pa. 2012).
See Id. at 225-26.
See Hunter v. Clarkson, 428 P.2d 210, 212 (Okla. 1967).
See Id. at 211.
See Id. at 212.
See Id.
See Id. at 213.
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determine whether a well is profitable, we decline to establish a definite
rule.”184 Instead, to determine what length period of time is appropriate
should be determined by looking at the totality of the specific
circumstances of each case.185 Courts reason that looking at profits and
losses of a lease over a reasonable period is necessary.186 This is so that
normal fluctuations such as unusual maintenance, the price of oil, etc. can
even out over time, giving the court a better idea of the overall profitability
of a lease.187 The Texas Supreme Court in Koontz, felt so strongly about
this idea that it said “[w]e again emphasize that there can be no limit as to
time, whether it be days, weeks, or months, to be taken into consideration in
determining the question of whether paying production from the lease has
ceased.”188
There being no set rule for determining a reasonable period of time, it
leaves decisions based on varying periods of time. In one case, a period of
thirteen years was found unreasonably long.189 Another case found a period
of fourteen months to be reasonable.190 It is widely accepted that a period of
no less than one year should be considered, however, beyond that it is
generally determined by the trial court depending on the circumstances of
each case.191 With this little guidance on what constitutes a reasonable
period of time, it makes it difficult for both the lessee and the lessor to have
an assurance of their rights. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in
Hunter v. Clarkson “[t]he landowner has an interest which must, and will,
be protected when the operator ceases production [f]or an unreasonable
time, without cause, after the expiration of the primary term.”192 With no
guidance of what a reasonable period for determination of production is

184. See T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 222 (Pa. 2012).
185. See Ross Expls., Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc., 640 Ark. 74, 81 (Ark. 2000), and see
Barby v. Singer, 648 P.2d 14, 16-17 (Okla. 1982), and see Fisher v. Grace Petroleum Corp.,
830 P.2d 1380, 1386 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) and see 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law
of Oil and Gas § 26.7(u) (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).
186. See Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 191 P.2d 616, 623-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
187. .See Id.
188. See Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 89 (Tex. 1959).
189. See Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 593 (Kan. 1980).
190. See Barby v. Singer, 648 P.2d 14, 16 (Okla. 1982).
191. See John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 270 (Thomson
West, 7th ed. 2018).
192. Hunter v. Clarkson, 428 P.2d 210, 213 (Okla. 1967).
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other than more than one year but less than thirteen years, the lessor has a
difficult time knowing if they even have a case with merits.193
IV. Suggested Approach
Oklahoma’s dependance on “production” as a term of art, as well as the
poorly defined “reasonable period of time” is a confusing method and
results in a poorly structured legal analysis. Many courts across the nation
rely on analyses that are far less confusing. For example, Kansas uses only
the objective test, while applying the same definition of “producing.”194
However, this method still creates uncertainty among the lessor and the
lessee. The lessee has no guarantee that even if prudent operators would
continue the lease that they themselves will be protected by the court. The
lessor has no guidance on how long an unreasonable cessation of
production is.
In the early twentieth century, West Virginia took the view that the
purpose of the oil and gas lease was that the lessor could obtain the required
diligence and skill necessary to obtain oil and gas.195 West Virginia did not
see “production” as a term of art meaning producing in paying quantities.
Instead, “produced” simply meant “as long as the premises are diligently
and efficiently operated, provided minerals shall have been discovered
within the fixed term.”196 The reasoning behind this view is similar to the
reasoning behind the “paying quantities” view, to honor the purpose of the
agreement. However, paying quantities jurisdictions view the purpose of
the lease as making land productive, and if it is not producing oil or gas in
paying quantities then it is not being productive.
Kentucky takes yet another view on the meaning of production in the
habendum clause. This view is similar to both West Virginia and Oklahoma
by striking a balance between the two. Kentucky’s view is that “produced”
in the habendum clause does not necessarily mean that it is producing in
paying quantities so that revenues exceed the lifting costs.197 A mere
showing of oil does not satisfy production, but instead there must be
enough that it is “susceptible of division” so that the lessee can pay a

193. See John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 270 (Thomson
West, 7th ed. 2018), and see Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 593 (Kan. 1980).
194. See Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 313-14 (Kan. 1976).
195. See South Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 450-51 (W. Va. 1912).
196. See Id. at 451.
197. See Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 329 (Ky. 1923).
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royalty to the lessor.198 Even if the royalty is small, as long as a royalty can
be paid production is satisfied.199
A. The Problem in Oklahoma
The current method in Oklahoma is unpredictable unless there is a prior
case on record that is exactly on point with the specific facts of a current
dispute. The reliance on both an objective and subjective test is very
operator friendly. At face value, turning the word “production” into a term
of art that means producing in paying quantities seems like it would favor
the mineral rights owner. However, the definition of paying quantities tips
it back, even if it is just slightly, in the favor of the lessee. The well never
has to pay for itself, only minimal operating expenses, and royalty
payments. It may seem like an operator’s safe haven, but that is not exactly
the case. At the same time, the requirement that a well must produce in
paying quantities puts an emphasis on the public interest in the production
of energy, actualized as oil and gas.
For the lessee, although the method seems rather operator friendly, it still
leaves questions without answers. While there are industry standards for
reasonable cessation of production, each well behaves differently. If you are
operating a well that takes just a little bit longer for the reservoir to reach
minimum pump levels again, you are unsure if you are protected by the
subjective method. In a separate vein, an operator may see value in
continuing to operate a lease with only marginal wells. However, if the
operator’s reason is anything other than the well’s eventual production in
paying quantities, it is deemed bad faith intent.
For the lessor, it's even more confusing. There is a general lack of
guidance as to what a reasonable period is for determining if a lease is
producing in paying quantities. While it is generally said that the period is
not less than one year, that is not a hard rule. A period of less than one year
could be looked at if a court deemed it fair. Similarly, it is not uncommon
for a single oil and gas lease to span multiple generations.200 At any point if
the lease stops producing, it is difficult for the lessor to bring suit. For
example, if an 80-year lease was producing up until the last year and a half
before the lease expired, there is little to suggest to the lessor that the court
would view that year and a half as having more weight than the prior 78½
years. But how many years does the well have to not produce before the
198. See Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 329-30 (Ky. 1923).
199. See Id.
200. See T.W. Phillips Oil & Gas Co. v. Jedlicka, 615 Pa. 199, 203 (Pa. 2012).
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court will deem that number of years as more important than the 80 years
prior when the well was producing? The law fails to answer these
questions. It also fails to address if the period of years that a well has been
producing changes the analysis. The above scenario would suggest that a
multi-generation well is given more protections that a new well.
Finally, the current method in Oklahoma leaves far too much room for a
judge to use their discretion. Ultimately, the judge decides what the
determinable period of time will be for production. Even during a jury trial,
the judge determines what period of time evidence must be pulled from.
Courts serve the purpose of making the law clear, using methods that
provide stability. One of the main functions of the law is to create
uniformity in the law. Oklahoma’s poor method of analysis does anything
but create uniformity in the decisions of the court. Worst of all, there is
little room for a trial court decision to be overturned unless the appellant
can prove that the trial court judge abused his/her discretionary power.
B. The Issue with the West Virginia View
The West Virginia view, similar to Oklahoma, is very lessee friendly.
This analysis turns on two objective questions. First, has oil or gas been
discovered in the primary term?201 Second, is the lessee operating the lease
diligently, and with the requisite skill level?202 The lessee need only to
show there is oil or gas present to extend the lease past the primary term
and into the secondary term with this loose definition of “produced.”
Lessors on the other hand, are left with few options to contest the validity
of a lease on the grounds of lack of production.
A lessor must show one of two things to prevail on ground of no
production. Either that there has been no discovery of oil or gas.203 Or, that
the lessee is not operating the lease effectively or diligently.204 This
requirement to show that the lease is not being operated within industry
standards is comparable to the Oklahoma standard requirement of a prudent
operator.
This method of analysis does not promote productivity of land. It does
not provide an incentive to the lessee to develop oil and gas wells, because
as long as they are working diligently, they are protected. If the well is not
producing in paying quantities, then the lessor will not receive royalties for
the oil or gas. While all oil and gas leases are essentially just a contract for
201.
202.
203.
204.

See South Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 451 (W. Va. 1912).
See South Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 451 (W. Va. 1912).
Id.
Id.
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the mutual benefit of the lessor and the lessee, the view of West Virginia
virtually gives the lessee all the power. A lessee would be able to maintain
a well for purely speculative purposes or hold the lease just so a competitor
would not be able to hold the lease. Ultimately, this method provides
virtually no protections for lessors or their payments. Similarly, it does not
promote the public’s interest in the production of oil and gas for consumers.
C. The Issue with the Kentucky View
The Kentucky method is the friendliest so far to lessors. This view
protects a lessor’s interest in royalty payments from oil or gas. It seems to
borrow from both prior methods with minor changes. Not using the paying
quantities limitation makes the method friendly to lessees, but the new
limitation, that the amount produced needs to be enough to make a royalty
payment, makes it also friendly to the lessor.
The issue with this method of analysis ultimately comes from the fact
that it does not strictly enforce the productivity of land. It requires more
productivity than the West Virginia view, but not as much as the Oklahoma
view. The balance works well for the competing interests of the lessor and
the lessee, but it leaves the public interest in the production of energy
materials with something to want. This method still only requires a
minimum effort of lease operators, which in turn means the land is not
being as productive as it could be. This method is friendly to the marginal
or sporadic well but does not require the operator to improve upon the well
in a way that under the Oklahoma method would be required of a prudent
operator.
D. Managing Interests
Each of the three methods discussed above has its pros and cons. The
perfect method would balance the interests of the lessor, lessee, and public
interest equally. However, we do not live in a perfect world with an
infallible court system. If the perfect legal analysis could be developed, it
would require a higher level of production than West Virginia or Kentucky
to protect the public interest. To protect the lessor’s interests, it would
require production in paying quantities similar to that of Oklahoma, but
with stricter guidelines. To protect the interests of the lessee, the analysis
would contain a grace period past the primary term similar to Kentucky’s
analysis while incorporating a subjective test similar to Oklahoma after the
grace period ends. In all instances it would require that there be a showing
of oil or gas for the lease to extend into the secondary term and follow the
same operator standards as required by West Virginia.
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1. Public Interest Protection
The Oklahoma method defines production in the habendum clause as
production in paying quantities. For this threshold to be met, the operator
must be making a profit. This requirement means that there would be
enough oil or gas being lifted that it is substantially providing the product
for the energy market. The general public has an interest in this kind of
work being done so that they can consume the product. Most consumers do
not realize the extent that oil and gas is needed, and how much is needed, to
go about their daily lives in their usual manner. Gas is needed to heat our
homes, cook our food, heat our water, dry our clothes, and many other daily
purposes. Oil is needed to keep our cars running, construct buildings, create
electronics, created household goods, and many other things. Our culture of
consumerism demands that these types of goods and services be available
to us almost 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days of the year. Because
of this consumer culture, the public has a strong interest in the active
production of oil and gas.
The requirement that oil and gas be produced on a lease in paying
quantities satisfies this public interest in a few ways. First, it motivates the
operator. If the lessee is not diligently working the lease in a manner that
results in producing wells, the lessee will lose the lease. Second, if the
lessee is not working to make a profit at a lease, a competitor will come in
and do it instead. The demand of consumerism creates many competitors,
and if one operator will not do the job, a lessor can be assured that another
operator will. So, a lessee may work prudently to keep competitors from a
particular lease, or they may not work prudently and someone else will.
2. Lessor Interest Protection
A lessor has an interest in getting paid for leasing out their mineral
interests. A lessor also has an interest in leasing to a prudent, diligent, and
skillful operator. This is because a prudent operator will extract more oil or
gas form the property, thus making the lessor’s royalty check larger. The
requirement that oil and gas be produced in paying quantities satisfies this
interest, but it puts a heavy burden on operators. While offering less
protection, the Kentucky method manages to protect the lessor’s interests
while creating less of a burden on the operator.
The lessor’s main interest is in the benefits they receive from the
production of oil or gas on their property. This is not only royalty
payments, but can also include bonuses, free gas, and more. If a lease is not
producing in paying quantities, the lessors might not receive all of their
interests. The production in paying quantities rule certainly provides the
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most protections to the lessors, however the Kentucky rule also ensures that
they will receive their benefits stemming from other interests. While lessors
might not receive as much in royalty payments, the operator must be able to
pay at least some amount in royalties in order to keep the lease. Similarly, if
the lessee is able to pay royalty payments, then it means that enough oil or
gas is being produced that the lessor might be able to receive some
additional benefits, such as free gas. At the same time, the operator’s
burden has decreased, giving them more time to achieve a higher output
from the well.
3. Lessee Interest Protection
First and foremost, the lessee has the goal of making a profit. To achieve
this goal, the company must not only produce enough oil so that their
revenues cover lifting costs but covers the total expenses of the company.
However, a large concern for each company is competition. Due to this
concern, it would benefit the company to hold a lease on oil-and-gas-rich
land for the sole purpose of keeping their competition from developing the
land. The lessee might not have an interest in developing the land anytime
soon, or even at all. Preventing competing companies from accessing the
land could be worth only holding the land for the primary term. While this
might be important to the lessee, it is in direct conflict with the interests of
the lessor and the public. However, the interest in producing oil and gas at a
profit is not in direct conflict. To do this, it takes time. So, the lessee’s
interest must also be protected so that the lease is not terminated
prematurely.
The best approach for protecting the lessee while harmonizing with both
the publics and the lessor’s interest is to define production following
Kentucky’s view. This method takes into account that many leases have
marginal or sporadic wells and does not punish a lessee for such luck.
However, it does require a minimum amount of production from the
operator in order to satisfy that lessor. The only issue that this minimum
effort production can continue for an indefinite period of time.
E. Striking a Balance
In order to protect the interests of each of the three parties, a fine line
must be walked. To achieve such a great feat, the three views of Oklahoma,
West Virginia, and Kentucky must be combined and modified. To satisfy
production in the habendum clause, the courts should follow the Kentucky
method while determining a minimum barrel amount per quarter. For
periods that do not meet production standards, there should be a two-step
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inquiry. Step one would follow the West Virginia methodology. Step two
would be the same subjective test that is currently used by Oklahoma.
1. Production Defined
The Kentucky view of production is that there has been enough oil or gas
produced to pay a royalty to the lessor.205 This view protects the lessee’s
interests by not placing a large burden of production on the operator, but
just a small minimum. It also protects the lessee by providing a guarantee of
royalty payments. However, it does not satisfy the public’s interest in
ensuring that there is enough oil in the market to meet consumer demands.
An additional step is necessary to address the public’s needs. Each
quarter, a lease would be required to have produced a minimum amount of
oil or gas. This amount would be determined by the court. The court should
look at the average amount of oil or gas taken from the region, the
formation being drilled, and the average production of operators of similar
means. From the average produced, then the minimum amount should be
determined as more than what is needed to pay a royalty, but less than
production in paying quantities. This would ensure that a substantial
amount of oil or gas is being produced, thus satisfying the lessor and the
public, but does not overly burden the operator. The goal of this minimum
is to create a production amount that is higher than Kentucky’s tangible and
substantial requirement but lower than Oklahoma’s paying quantities
requirement.206
When determining the minimum quarterly amount, the drilling region
should be analyzed because geological differences affect the lifting of oil
and gas. For example, the porosity of the earth in a particular region can
affect the drilling of oil and gas.207 The formation that is being drilled
should be considered in combination with the region because each deposit
of oil or gas will have a different reservoir pressure. If the pressure is low, it
can cause the amounts of oil and gas being drilled in that area to be lower.
Pressure that is too high can make a drill site dangerous causing slow
operations.208 With each case, the comparison should weigh operators of
similar means and size. This is because it would be unequitable to hold a
small operation to the same standard as a large corporate operation.

205. See Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 329-30 (Ky. 1923).
206. See Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 330 (Ky. 1923).
207. See generally, John S. Lowe Et Al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law 15-16,
(Thomson West, 7th ed. 2018).
208. See generally, id. at 16-18.
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By applying the above three factors into a minimum standard, it
combines both objective values and subjective values. The region’s
geological composition is objective and affects each drilling rig in that area.
The formation’s reservoir pressure similarly affects all operations in the
region that are tapping into the same reservoir. However, by only
comparing operators to those in a similar position, it adds a subjective value
to the analysis. These considerations protect both the lessee and the lessor.
The lessee is protected because the court will take factors outside of their
control into consideration. The lessor is protected because their contract
will not be terminated simply because a small-business lessee is not able to
produce at the same level as a large corporation. By avoiding this risk, the
lessor’s interests in payments are protected while simultaneously providing
protection to small businesses.
2. Periods in which Production Lapses
The production of oil and gas, while well researched, can be
unpredictable at times. Equipment can stop working and need repairs, or
even to be replaced. The pressure of the reservoir may suddenly drop. Or,
as many contracts provide for in express language, there can be “acts of
God,” like extreme flooding which prevents operations by making the well
inaccessible for an unknown period of time. In any of those events, as well
as many others, the lessee needs protections. For periods outside of the
primary term during which production as defined in the previous section
ceases, a two-step analysis will be applied by the court.
The first step of the two-step analysis is to ask the question “Has there
been a showing of oil and gas on the leased property?” This question is
taken directly from the West Virginia methodology. By asking this
question, the spirit of the purpose behind the lease is honored.209 However,
the amount of oil that has been shown to be present on the property must be
enough to justify the continuation of the lease, which ties directly into step
two. In the event that there is not a showing of any oil or gas on the
property, the analysis ends at the first step, and the lease is terminated.
The second step of the analysis is Oklahoma’s subjective test with a
minor adjustment. This test would still turn on an operator’s good faith
intentions, just as it does in Oklahoma.210 The standard in this analysis
would be whether under all the relevant circumstances and the amount of
209. See South Penn. Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 451 (W. Va. 1912).
210. See 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.7(e) (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed.).
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oil and gas shown present on the leased property, a reasonable and prudent
operator would “continue to operate a well in the manner in which the well
in question was operated.”211
Step one protects the lessor and the lessee. The lessor is protected
because the lease terminates in the event that there is no showing of oil or
gas present on the property. This allows the lessor to gain their property
rights back without the intrusion of the operating company on their land, or
it allows the lessor to seek a new oil and gas lease from another company
that may find oil and gas on the property at a different depth. The lessee is
also protected in this event, as they would no longer need to pay to operate
on the leased premises or pay delay rentals. The lessee is protected in the
opposite event as well. If there is a showing that oil and gas is present on
the leased property, then the lease is protected subject to the second step of
the analysis. If the operator acts diligently, prudently, and in good faith,
then he need not be wary of step two.
The second step of the analysis protects all three parties of interest: the
lessor, the lessee, and the general public. The lessor is protected in two
ways. The first is similar to the protection provided by the first step. If the
operator is not acting in a prudent way, then the lease is terminated. When
this happens, the lessor can go find a different operator who will operate the
well with diligence and good faith intentions. The second way the lessor is
protected is that if the lessee is operating the well as he should, the lessor’s
lease is not cancelled. This gives him stability with regards to his rights, as
well as the possibility of future royalty payments. The lessee is protected
because the lease is not canceled simply because there is no production. As
long as the lessee is operating as he should, his lease is not in jeopardy.
Lastly, the general public’s interest in the production of oil and gas is
protected. Its interest is protected similarly to the first way the lessor is
protected. If the lease is not being handled properly, then someone else can
come in and produce oil and gas prudently. Second, its interests are
protected because this step of the analysis ensures that an operator is
actively working towards producing oil and gas to provide it to the
consumer market.
V. Conclusion
Production in Oklahoma does not just mean production. It really means
production in paying quantities. However, this definition does not lend
itself to a legal analysis that provides consistent results. Neither does it
211. See Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 89 (Tex. 1959).
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provide many protections to parties other than the operator. While other
states utilize other definitions and other legal analyses, they still fall short.
The best way to protect the lessor, lessee, and the public is to apply a
hybrid approach when interpreting production in the oil and gas lease. This
method requires only enough oil and gas to pay a royalty to the lessor while
simultaneously meeting a minimum barrel requirement. In the event that the
lessee is not satisfying production as so defined, then the courts will apply a
two-step analysis in order to determine if the lease should be terminated.
First, the court should ask if there has been a showing of oil or gas on the
property. If not, then the lease is terminated. If so, then the court should
move on to step two. Step two applies a subjective test to the operator. This
step asks if a reasonably prudent operator would continue to operate a well
under the same circumstance and in the same way as the lessee. If the
answer is no, then the lease is terminated. If the answer is yes, then they
lease may continue. This approach creates clear guidelines for operators to
follow and makes the guidelines simple for the lessee to understand. This
approach also protects the public’s interest in the production of energy
materials. Similarly, this approach creates consistent results in the court
system.
Ultimately no analysis, system, or definition will be perfect. To avoid the
headache altogether, provide explicit language within each oil and gas
lease. If all terms are defined in a clear manner, then the court does not
need to supply its own definitions. Similarly, provide clear meanings for
savings clauses. With a clear meaning and application laid out in the lease,
the court only needs to look to the four corners of the document and apply
the lease as it was written.
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